But the connexion, though
less obvious, is not less real. He who accepts benefits, and denies a
return of them when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one
of the most natural and reasonable of expectations, and one which he
must at least tacitly have encouraged, otherwise the benefits would
seldom have been conferred. The important rank, among human evils and
wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that
it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts
as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which human
beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on
which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the
hour of need; and few wrongs are greater than this mere withholding of
good; none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in
a sympathizing spectator. The principle, therefore, of giving to each
what they deserve, that is, good for good as well as evil for evil, is
not only included within the idea of Justice as we have defined it, but
is a proper object of that intensity of sentiment, which places the
Just, in human estimation, above the simply Expedient.
Most of the maxims of justice current in the world, and commonly
appealed to in its transactions, are simply instrumental to carrying
into effect the principles of justice which we have now spoken of.
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