The general consensus seems to be that Hitler's interference in military matters led to Germany's defeat in WW2, but really this seems to lack something in the way of _object_ivity and was also a convenient excuse for the German generals to blame him since he wasn;t exactly around to defend himself (and after such an unmitigated disaster..hardly anyone would dare to). Now some comments from others here would be greatly useful in providing clarity where I may be incorrect. Also I must state btw I am not an apologist for the man who was clearly a tyrant of an almost unimaginable magnitude.  But I do think he has been unfairly characterized as non-human which in my mind deflates the whole lesson from history that can be garnered from that miserable (though highly interesting) period of history. Clearly some credit has to be given him for the early victories of the war since many generals reportedly expected something similar to WW1. Although I may be wrong, is it not correct to assign Hitler some credit for the use and implementation of the general blitzrkieg strategy?  The very fact that the French and Russians used their armor in penny packets initially obviously states something revolutionary (though my understanding is that Guderian just advanced the idea originally derived from the Brits) that Hitler must be given credit (I doubt he was passive during the decision making process here). So: 1. Hitler must be given credit for authorizing and recognizing the wisdom of using the Blitzkrieg stategy. 2. Manstein's Ardennes offensive strategy against the French was clearly the minority viewpoint at the time and was grasped by Hitler which much enthusiasm (though he suffered understandable groaning regarding possible flank attacks on the extended columns)without which it would not have been implemented. 3. Although Adolf Galland stated that Hitler let the Brits go at Dunkirk I have also read that it was not exactly suitable terrain to send the panzers. Was this a mistake on his part or was it his only real option? 3. His aid of Mussolini in North Africa and the Balkans were necessary and wise decisions which seems to have taken up little in terms of German resources. The whole point of Rommel was simply to HOLD. 4. The blame that Hitlers impulsive ( operation retribution ) Balkans campaign significantly delayed Barbarrosa enough to cause it to fail seems to have been incorrect _base_d on the fact that the Polish rivers had significant flooding at the time that would have delayed it nonetheless (and the balkan campaign probably led to some needed experience of some Axis troops who otherwise would not have it before June 22nd as well as additional units). 5. Hitler's decision to invade the USSR was really his only option. Any kind of Mediterranean campaign after the fall of france really would have been playing at the periphery and any benefits not really being decisive in terms of creating a German victory in europe. The Kriegsmarine was really too small to handle an invasion of the UK (casualties during the Norge invasion) and an extensive move into the middle east may have overstretched the Wehrmacht. Inevitably the war would have to be won or lost in the east and with the seemingly inevitable entry of the USA into the conflict 1941 had to be that year. 6. Many seem to think that after Smolensk was taken the failure to continue the advance to Moscow by army group centre was a classic error made primarily by Hitler. In fact the whole point was not to conquer cities (though Moscow was clearly an important one) but to defeat the oppositions armies in the field. The Soviet disaster at Kiev was well worth the sidetrack _base_d on the 600k+ killed and captured.  Hitler had won the argument and the benefits were reaped (at least temporarily). 7. After the failure of Typhoon in front of Moscow many in the german high command wanted to retreat all the way back to the polish border. Hitler correctly argued that this was completely pointless as there were no dug in positions there and they would have to abandon tons of equipment. This prevented the Russian winter offensive turning into a complete route (though perhaps the soviets had limitations themselves here). Up to this point one could say Hitler's decisions seems to have been superior to his generals (consensus) which led to a kind of overconfidence in his own abilities that led to worse results in the latter years of the war.  But hold on: 8. Declaration of war on the USA may have been his worst decision but the U-boats were highly successful at that point, the US highly vulnerable, the Japanese had the initiative in the Pacific and would at the very least suck up alot of US resources..and the USSR after taking huge casualties in 1941 would likely be defeated in 1942.  Crazy..yeah kinda..but not really that irrational when looked within the context of the times. 9.  Operation Blue towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus was probably the better decision than going for Moscow if one wants to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Why? a) moscow was too predictable and the soviets were likely assuming the attack was going to be there. b) cutting off the caucuses and seizing its oil would have denied russia this supply and provided it to the Axis which needed it badly.  Also the germans could only really afford an offensive along a limited front in the east and this drive would seem the most logical. 10. The wehrmacht getting sucked into street to street fighting in Stalingrad was ridiculous for an army that functioned best in open terrain. Terrible mistake though again likely rationalized by the Soviets perceived to be on their last legs so the germans could afford a war of attrition at that point. 11. The dumping of large numbers of troops into North Africa just before they surrendered is probably less foolish than regarded today since Hitler was likely very aware the loss of Africa meant his Italy would collapse soon after (and i think they were the bulk of the troops landed anyways). 12. The not one step back mentality that frequently developed in the later years was largely foolish as it diminished flexibility. Yet he must have been conscious of the fact that Germany's economic flexibility was hampered: 1) the more you retreat the more natural resources slip out of your hands 2) germans units had fuel shortages so its not like maneuverability was unlimited so perhaps Mansteins plan at kursk...withdrawal and when russian supply lines extended then attack may not have been realistic 3) the appearance of defeat may mean countries such as Sweden may decide to cuttoff Iron ore supplies etc. 13. Ardennes offensive could have been cancelled and the Rhine could have been used as a defensive barrier instead and maybe prolongued the war. Both options were terrible and he was just clutching at straws at this point. Was the offensive really worse than the defensive option? I guess alot of these points are to say that Hitlers decisionmaking was although no neccesarily normal but at least has some residue of rationality attached. This of course risks making him seem more human that the current stereotypes allow, but then is not the whole warning here to be _base_d on the fact that a very human being has the potential for monstrous crimes and that the more he is like us the more we need to stand on guard against certain human tendencies (towards becoming idealogues etc). Just some thoughts..thanks.

5. Hitler's decision to invade the USSR was really his only option. And since it was a foolish option, very likely to lead to defeat, Hitler is responsible for placing Germany in a position where that was the only option .  BARBAROSSA came fairly close to defeating the USSR, but that was largely because of Stalin's colossal blunder in refusing to believe that Germany was going to invade. Which Hitler did not know of and could not have expected. It can also be pointed out that the Wehrmacht's inadequate preparation for BARBAROSSA was Hitler's responsibility. Everything went their way, yet they still failed - out of fuel, out of food, lacking proper clothing. The unrealism of German planning can be directly traced to Hitler's overconfidence. After the defeat before Moscow and the involvement of the U.S. (both due to Hitler), Germany was doomed. (I agree that Hitler was not a fool to declare war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor... but it is equally arguable that he was a fool to incite Japan to war against the U.S. and pledge to follow Japan. Without an act of war against the U.S., it would have been a long time, before the U.S. entered the war - if it ever did.)

of Mediterranean campaign after the fall of france really would have been playing at the periphery and any benefits not really being decisive in terms of creating a German victory in europe. This makes no sense, but no one ever said victory over Russia would create German victory in Europe.   By June 1941 it was reasonable to sum up that German victory in Europe had been successfully achieved, except only for the British Isles and the neutral enclaves (Sweden, Switzerland.)   German boots controlled and boats patrolled the Atlantic seaboard and the Ionian Sea, and co-operative dictators such as Franco and Mussolini allowed Germany to do much as it pleased (e.g. supply U-boars from neutral Spanish ports.)  Stalin was a co-operative dictator in that the Nazi-Soviet Pact still supplied Hitler with oil and other useful munitions and Stalin had carefully avoided provocation. We still need to be told who thinks Barbarossa was Hitler's only option in 1941 and for what factual reasons.  Co-operation extended from trade to the exchange of KGB and SS detainees and no recorded fact suggests Stalin planned to disrupt this. We do not see why continued collaboration was not an option.

13. Ardennes offensive could have been cancelled and the Rhine could have been used as a defensive barrier instead and maybe prolongued the war. Both options were terrible and he was just clutching at straws at this point. Was the offensive really worse than the defensive option? Bulge was a gamble.  a losing gamble  Long odds for a win agisnt inevitable loss.

A Napoleon would have won the war. but take Moscow and you win the war. Napoleon took Moscow and lost the war.

Napoleon took Moscow and lost the war. Spot on. What's most important, he didn't conquer the city; he merely occupied it after Russians evacuated it and started fires themselves. So even as Moscow was an important symbol, losing it would not necessary mean collapse of Russia, as there was a good historic example to dwell on.